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SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE, 1973 TERM
RULE 1Ob-5 - EXPANDING INSIDER LIABILITY
Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
The liability of corporate insiders' for violations of federal securi-
ties laws has recently come under close scrutiny by the Second Circuit.
In a decision of far-reaching importance, Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,2 the court held that recipients of inside in-
formation (tippees) who buy or sell securities without disclosure of the
information can be held liable under rule lOb-53 in a private action
for damages brought by persons trading in the stock over a national
securities exchange. Judge Timbers, writing for the unanimous panel,
also ruled that the tippers of the information can be held accountable
even though they themselves did not trade in the security. Moreover,
the Shapiro court made fundamental changes in the elements necessary
to establish a private cause of action for securities fraud. Shapiro sub-
stantially eliminates the requirement of privity4 and provides that the
requisite showing of causation may be satisfied by proof of the ma-
teriality of the inside information.
Historically, insider trading in the public securities markets has
been viewed with disapprovalY The insider, with his unique possession
1 The term "insider" has been defined as anyone who has a "relationship giving
access" to inside information. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961). In Ross v.
Licht, 263 F. Supp. 595, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), this definition was held to include outside
"tippees." This view of the corporate insider gained recognition by the Second Circuit in
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969), when it imposed the insider's duty upon "anyone in possession of material
inside information." Id.
2495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
3 Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974), was promulgated by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission pursuant to authority granted in section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1974). The rule provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directy or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of
a national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,
or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974).
4 See notes 80 33 and accompanying text infra.
1 See 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIONS 1037 (2d ed. 1961), where special mention is
made of the 1934 report of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, which con-
demned the practice of insider trading:
Among the most vicious practices unearthed at the hearings before the sub-
committee was the flagrant betrayal of their fiduciary duties by directors and
officers of corporations who used their positions of trust and the confidential
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of confidential information, is able to trade with foreknowledge of
such corporate developments as pending mergers, technological break-
throughs, or earnings forecasts. Such conduct threatens investor con-
fidence in the integrity of the securities marketplace by permitting a
privileged few to profit at the expense of the uninformed public.6
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19347 was enacted
by Congress in an attempt to curb these unscrupulous practices. The
section confers upon the SEC broad power to regulate the purchase and
sale of securities.8 Rule lOb-5, adopted in pursuance of this authority,
makes it unlawful (1) to employ a scheme to defraud; (2) to make false
statements of, or fail to disclose, material facts; or (3) to engage in any
other act which would operate as a fraud in connection with the pur-
chase or sale of a security.9 Judicial recognition of the remedial intent
underlying both section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 has resulted in a broaden-
ing of the scope of these provisions, making them effective weapons
against insider trading.' 0
information which came to them in such positions, to aid them in their market
activities.
Id., citing CoMMIrrrm ON BANKING & CURRENCY, STOCK EXCHANGE PRAcrIcEs, S. REP. No.
1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1934). The Second Circuit has recognized that "Congress was
concerned about the plight of the average public investor who is at serious disadvantage
in dealing with persons possessing superior knowledge, skill and resources." Chris-Craft
Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 357 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 910 (1973).
6The deterrence of such insider trading has been recognized by the Second Circuit
as a primary aim of rule lOb-5: "The essential purpose of rule lOb-5, as we have stated
time and again, is to prevent corporate insiders and their tippees from taking unfair ad-
vantage of the uninformed outsiders." Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464
F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1972). If lOb-5 performs its intended function, "all investors trading
on impersonal exchanges [will] have relatively equal access to material information. . . ."
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969). See generally Comment, Fashioning a Lid for Pandora's Box: A Legitimate Role for
Rule 10b-5 in Private Actions Against Insider Trading on a National Stock Exchange, 16
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 404 (1969). See also Comment, Insider Trading Without Disclosure-
Theory of Liability, 28 Osno Sr. L.J. 472, 477-79 (1967).
7 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
8 See id.
9 See note 3 supra.
10In Shapiro the Second Circuit noted that
it is important to bear in mind that "Congress intended securities legislation
enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds to be construed 'not technically and
restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes.' "
495 F.2d at 235, quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972).
For an excellent discussion of current developments in the area of rule 10b-5, see Note,
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Although neither section 10(b) nor rule lOb-5 explicitly provides a
private remedy, the courts have long recognized a private cause of ac-
tion to enforce the provisions." Because the private lOb-5 action is a
creature of the courts, there has been considerable confusion as to req-
uisite elements of the action. Courts have at various times incor-
porated the tests employed in common law fraud, including privity,
misrepresentation, materiality, scienter, reliance, and causation. 12 The
Shapiro court was thus confronted with the task of defining the nature
and the scope of the cause of action.
In 1966, Merrill Lynch, in its posture as prospective managing
underwriter of a Douglas Aircraft debenture issue, became privy to
material inside information concerning Douglas' projected earnings.13
This information indicated a significant downward adjustment in
Douglas' estimated future profits. Merrill Lynch divulged this informa-
tion to several of its major clients, the majority of whom were institu-
tional investors. 14 The Merrill Lynch customers sold over 165,000
Douglas shares on the New York Stock Exchange within a four-day
period preceding public disclosure of the information. As a result, the
selling tippees were able to minimize their losses on the Douglas stock,
and Merrill Lynch received brokerage commissions on the transac-
tions.15 The uninformed investing public sustained substantial losses. 16
SEC Rule 10b-5: A Recent Profile, 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 860 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Recent Profile]. See also Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5: Judicial Revision of
Legislative Intent? 57 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 627 (1963).
11 See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971),
wherein Justice Douglas commented that "[ilt is now established that a private right of
action is implied under 10b." The cause of action was first recognized in Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The court in Astor v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 206 F. Supp. 1333 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), summarized the rationale for judi-
cial recognition of a private action as follows:
This private right of action is predicated on the grounds (1) that a person
injured by a violation of a statute enacted for his benefit is entitled to sue on his
own behalf and recover his damages . . . (2) that the aims of the 1934 Act re-
quire that the investing public be completely and effectively protected ...and
"it is for the federal courts 'to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary
relief' where federally secured rights are invaded."
Id. at 1340, quoting J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964).
12 See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner 9- Smith, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 264, 270
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (Tenney, J.), aff'd, 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974); Recent Profile, supra note
10, at 860. Cf. Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1291 (2d Cir. 1969)
(Kaufman, J.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
13 495 F.2d at 231-32. The information disclosed that Douglas would report sub-
stantially lower income for the first six months of 1966 than it had for that year's first five
months and that Douglas had sharply reduced its estimate of earnings for the full 1966
and 1967 fiscal years. Id. at 232.
14 Id.
15 Id. In addition to its commissions, Merrill Lynch also received "give-ups," shares of
the commissions of other brokers who executed orders for the defendants. Id.
16 495 F.2d at 233. In SEC administrative proceedings precipitated by these transac-
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The plaintiffs, five individuals who had purchased Douglas stock in the
open market during the period of nondisclosure, brought an action for
damages against both Merrill Lynch and the beneficiaries of the Merrill
Lynch tip.17 The district court denied defendants' motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim18 and an appeal was taken to the Second Cir-
cuit.19
In affirming the district court's decision, the Second Circuit ap-
plied the "disclose or abstain" rule announced in SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co.20 In Texas Gulf Sulphur, an SEC-enforcement action,21 it
was held that an insider must either abstain from trading in the securi-
tions, Merrill Lynch's New York institutional sales office was suspended for 15 days and
the tippees were ordered censured by the SEC. Id. at n.9.
17 Id. at 232-33. Only one of the five plaintiffs had actually purchased Douglas stock
before the information was made public. Nonetheless, the defendants' motion to dismiss
as to the other four plaintiffs was denied by the district court on the ground that the
record did not establish at what time full disclosure was effected. The district court in-
dicated that conceivably the press release could have been issued one minute prior to
the opening of the Exchange and the plaintiffs could have placed their orders one
minute after the opening. In such case, reasoned the court, full disclosure would not have
been achieved. 353 F. Supp. at 279-80.
18 353 F. Supp. 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). In the district court, Judge Tenney denied the
defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings. He held that Merrill Lynch violated
a duty owed the plaintiffs by furtively disclosing material information to its customers,
the selling defendants. The selling defendants, in turn, violated their duty to the
plaintiffs by selling the Douglas stock without disclosing the material inside information.
Id. at 275-79. It was ruled that the conduct of all the defendants, as pleaded in the com-
plaint, stated a claim for which relief could be granted under section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5. Id. at 280.
19 Appeal was taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970), despite the interlocutory
nature of the district court's order. Section 1292(b) permits a district judge to certify to
the court of appeals interlocutory orders involving controlling issues of law. The ap-
pellate court may then, in its discretion, accept the appeal. Judge Tenney amended his
original order to provide for the requisite certification. 495 F.2d at 234.
20401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (Waterman, J.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969). The court held that
anyone in possession of material inside information must either disclose it to
the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it . . . must abstain
from trading in or recommending the securities concerned while such inside in-
formation remains undisclosed.
Id. at 848.
21 The SEC brought an action in the district court against Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.
and a number of its officers, directors and employees, seeking to enjoin the allegedly
violative conduct and to compel rescission by individual defendants of their illegal
securities transactions. Id. at 839. Having determined the issue of liability, the Second
Circuit remanded to the district court to decide the appropriate relief. The SEC sought
to divest each of the individual defendants of profits realized on the illegal transactions.
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 812 F. Supp. 77, 93, aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 446
F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971). The court granted the requested
relief and held that funds thus accruing would be held in escrow for a three-year
period, subject to disposition by the court upon application of the SEC or other in-
terested party. Upon the expiration of such period, the remaining funds would inure to
Texas Gulf Sulphur. Id. at 93. The other defendants were enjoined from exercising
illegally obtained stock options. Id. at 98.
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ties concerned while the inside information remains undisclosed, or
must himself disclose it to the investing public.22
The Shapiro court held that a violation of this "disclose or ab-
stain" rule can subject the insiders to a private action for damages.23
Moreover, the definition of insider was expanded to include tippees,
i.e., the recipients of inside information.24 In reaching this decision,
the court relied heavily upon dicta in the Texas Gulf Sulphur opinion.
In that case, Judge Waterman declared the tippee's conduct "equally
reprehensible"25 and indicated that liability for lOb-5 violations could
be imposed upon "anyone in possession of material inside informa-
tion."26 Shapiro rejected the argument that the tippees would be unable
to make an effective public disclosure of information regarding a cor-
22 See note 20 supra.
23 495 F.2d at 236:
Although Texas Gulf was an SEC injunction action, the strong public policy
considerations behind our "disclose or abstain" rule are equally applicable
here.
Extension of the Texas Gulf Sulphur "disclose or abstain" rule to private actions
seems appropriate in view of the purposes of the Securities Exchange Act and section
10(b) in particular. On several occasions, the Second Circuit has noted that the con-
gressional intent in enacting section 10(b) was to protect the investing public and to secure
fair dealings in securities markets by promoting full disclosure of inside information.
Presumably, if material facts are made available to all, investors can make informedjudgments as to their prospective transactions. See, e.g., Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air
Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 793 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970); SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969). The general purpose behind the Act was stated by the House Committee as fol-
lows:
Manipulation and dishonest practices of the market place thrive upon mystery
and secrecy. The disclosure of information materially important to the investors
may not instantaneously be reflected in market value, but despite the intricacies
of security values truth does find relatively quick acceptance on the market.
That is why in many cases it is so carefully guarded. Delayed, inaccurate and
misleading reports are the tools of the unconscionable market operator and
recreant corporate official who speculate on inside information.
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934).
The Supreme Court has declared its intention to enforce this legislation flexibly and
creatively. For example, in J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), the Court recog-
nized a private remedy for violation of the SEC proxy rules promulgated pursuant to§ 14a of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1970). Writing for a unanimous
Court, Justice Clark stated, "[1]t is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such
remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose." Id. at 433. The
Court has found this flexible standard appropriate in lOb-5 actions as well. See, e.g.,
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972); Superintendent of Ins. v.
Bankers Life Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971). See also SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963) (securities antifraud legislation to be construed
"flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes').
24 495 F.2d at 237-38.
25 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 833, 852-53 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969). However, the tippees in Texas Gulf were not named as defendants
in the action.
26 Id. at 848.
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poration with which they were not associated. 27 Judge Timbers stated
that the duty is not "a naked one to disclose, but a duty to abstain from
trading unless they do disclose." 28 Since the tippees knew or should
have known that the information came from nonpublic sources within
the corporation, their failure to refrain from trading rendered them
liable in damages.29 Moreover, this liability could be enforced by per-
sons not in privity with the tippees. The court held that the duty to dis-
close or abstain ran to the benefit of all uninformed purchasers of
Douglas stock during the critical time period during which the defen-
dants alone had access to the inside information.30
Having determined that tippees as well as tippers can be liable in
a lob-5 action, the court was compelled to consider whether these plain-
tiffs were so damaged by the activities of the defendants as to entitle
them to relief. The defendants argued that a lack of privity would bar
recovery. It was contended that the plaintiffs could not establish that
their damages were caused by acts of the defendants, since plaintiffs
were not in privity with either the tippers or tippees.31 The com-
plainants had bought their shares of Douglas stock on the New York
Stock Exchange and were unable to establish that they had purchased
the actual securities that the tippers were selling8 2 While conceding
that the plaintiffs must establish the existence of a causal relationship
between their losses and defendants' acts, the court nevertheless held
that the causation element could be satisfied without a showing of
privity. 3 Plaintiffs were relieved of the duty to trace their purchases, a
27 495 F.2d at 237-88.
28 Id. at 238.
29 Id.
3o Id. at 237. The court reasoned that in the context of trading on a national securi-
ties exchange, limiting the defendants' duty to disclose to those who actually purchased
the shares from them would frustrate the purposes of the securities laws:
To hold that Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 impose a duty to disclosc material
inside information only in face-to-face transactions or to the actual purchasers
or sellers on an anonymous public stock exchange, would be to frustrate a major
purpose of the securities laws: to insure the integrity and efficiency of the
securities markets.
Id. Any attempt at matching buyers and sellers in an effort to establish privity would be
virtually futile. See 2 BROMBERG, SEcumsms LAw: FRAUD SEC RULE l0b-5 8.6(1) (1973).
Thus, the court concluded that disclosure was a duty owed to all members of that class
of stockholders who purchased the concerned stock in the open market during the period
of nondisclosure. 495 F.2d at 237. See Painter, Inside Information: Growing Pains for the
Development of Federal Corporation Law Under Rule lOb-5, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1861,
1378 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Painter].
3' 495 F.2d at 239.
32 Id. at 236.
33Id. at 289. The court indicated that the privity requirement had already been
substantially weakened by other courts. Id. at 239, quoting Mitchell v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 101-02 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971). See Astor
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 806 F. Supp. 1333, 1341 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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task that would be impossible where the trading occurred on "anony-
mous public stock exchanges." 34
The court next considered whether there was a sufficient causal
connection between the defendants' actions and the plaintiffs' damages.
The defendants maintained that it was Douglas' poor financial condi-
tion, not the extensive insider trading, which was responsible for the
drop in the price of Douglas stock.85 Furthermore, since the plaintiffs
were unaware of defendants' actions, it was argued they would have
purchased their stock regardless of the lOb-5 violations.3 6 Rejecting
these contentions, the court ruled that the requisite element of causa-
tion was established by the mere fact that the insiders acted without
disclosing "material ... information which plaintiffs as reasonable in-
vestors might have considered important in making their decision to
purchase Douglas stock." T
The causation requirement has had a confused and rather mud-
dled history in the Second Circuit. This confusion has resulted in part
from the fact that causation and reliance have been spoken of inter-
changeably.3 8 The traditional test for reliance was expounded by the
Second Circuit in List v. Fashion Park, Inc.39: "IT]he test of 'reliance'
is whether the 'misrepresentation is a substantial factor in determining
the course of conduct which results in [the] ... loss.' ,o The List court
also distinguished between reliance and "materiality," both of which
were held necessary elements of the plaintiff's cause of action.41 In de-
34 495 F.2d at 236, 239.
35 Id. at 238.
SO Id. The district court in Shapiro commented upon the weakness of this argument:
Plaintiffs had no knowledge of defendants' transaction and it logically follows
that plaintiffs' decision to purchase Douglas stock would have been unaffected
had defendants abstained from any transactions. But therein lies the fallacy of
defendants' reasoning; it is not the act of trading which causes plaintiffs' injury,
it is the act of trading without disclosing material inside information which
causes plaintiffs' injury.
353 F. Supp. at 278 (emphasis in original).
87495 F.2d at 238.
38 See, e.g., List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 882 U.S.
811 (1965), where the Second Circuit held that "[t]he reason for this (reliance] require-
ment, . .. is to certify that the conduct of the defendant actually caused the plaintiff's
injury." Id. at 462 (emphasis added). See also Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d.
1167, 1172 (2d Cir. 1970); Astor v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 306 F. Supp. 1333, 1341
(S.D.N.Y. 1969). Professor Painter has criticized the judicial fusion of the two concepts.
He argues that "[a]lthough causation and reliance are closely related, they are analytically
distinct, and analysis of these problems is easier if the terms are not used interchange-
ably." Painter, supra note 80, at 1369.
39340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
40Id. at 462, quoting RsrATENENT oF ToRTS § 546 (1938).
41 Id.
The court expressly refused to discard the reliance requirement merely to facilitate
the maintenance of private lob-5 damage actions. Judge Waterman, author of the List
opinion, commented:
1975]
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termining materiality, the issue is whether "'a reasonable man would
attach importance [to the fact misrepresented] in determining his
choice of action in the transaction in question.'"42 Thus, the reliance
test focuses upon the subjective considerations of the particular plain-
tiff, whereas the materiality determination employs the objective
standards of a reasonable man. In a nondisclosure case, these "parallel"
requirements will be satisfied by a showing that the plaintiff would
have been induced to act differently than he did had the withheld in-
formation been made known to him.
48
It appears that the Shapiro plaintiffs could have established a
cause of action under the List test.44 However, the Shapiro court went
beyond List and, by applying the rationale of Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States,45 abandoned completely the distinction between reliance
and materiality. In Affiliated Ute, the Supreme Court held that reliance
need not be established in order to recover:
All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material in the
sense that a reasonable investor might have considered them im-
portant in the making of this decision.... This obligation to dis-
close and this withholding of a material fact establish the
requisite element of causation in fact.48
Affiliated Ute, however, involved direct transactions in which it was
alleged that a class of stockholders was defrauded in a series of direct,
face-to-face transactions. 47 The defendants in Shapiro contended that
Affiliated Ute should be restricted to its facts. Judge Timbers, in re-
jecting this contention, ruled that the test of causation does not vary
according to the nature of the transaction involved. Section 10(b) and
Assuredly, to abandon the requirement of reliance would be to facilitate out-
siders' proof of insiders' fraud, and to that extent the interpretation for which
plaintiff contends might advance the purposes of Rule lOb-5. But this strikes us
as an inadequate reason for reading out of the rule so basic an element of tort
law as the principle of causation in fact.
Id. at 463.
42 Id., quoting REsrATEMNT oF TORTS § 538(2)(a) (1938).
43 Id. at 463. See Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1172 (2d Cir. 1970).
44 Judge Timbers declared that the "causation in fact requirement is satisfied by
plaintiffs' allegation that they would not have purchased Douglas stock if they had known
of the information withheld by defendants." 495 F.2d at 240.
45 406 U.S. 128 (1972). In Affiliated Ute, a large number of stockholders were de-
frauded by the employees of a bank which was acting as their broker. The bank em-
ployees had arranged the sale of stocks without informing the shareholders of either the
bank's position as market maker or the true value of the stock. Id. at 145-47.
46Id. at 153-54. The Supreme Court applied the rationale of Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970), to the lob-5 situation. In Mills, an action arising
under rule 14(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14(a) (1974), the Court held that a material omission
from a proxy statement was sufficient to warrant inferring the existence of a relationship
between the violation and injury. 396 U.S. at 384.
47 See 406 U.S. at 14547.
[Vol. 49:395
SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE, 1973 TERM
rule lOb-5 embody a general policy to prohibit disreputable securities
practices and to maintain an honest and fair marketplace for securities,
whether the transactions are "conducted face-to-face, over the counter,
or on the exchanges." 48
In sum, Shapiro imposes upon nontrading tippers of corporate
inside information and their trading tippees a duty to disclose their
secrets to the investing public if they wish to make use of the informa-
tion. Absent full disclosure, insiders must abstain both from trading in
the securities and from recommending that others do so. Violation of
this rule is grounds for a private action for damages by all uninformed
persons who purchased the stock in the open market during the period
of nondisclosure. Moreover, the requirement of causation will be
satisfied by proof of materiality.
Shapiro contains few novel ideas in the substantive law of lOb-5
liability. Application of the "disclose and abstain" rule to tippees was
implicitly recognized by the Second Circuit in Texas Gulf Sulphur.4 9
The abandonment of the privity requirement is in accordance with the
tenor of prior case law.50 Similarly, the modification of the causation-in-
fact test is consonant with the approach taken by the Supreme Court in
Affiliated Ute.51 The significance of the Shapiro decision lies in the
court's pulling together the common threads running through Texas
Gulf Sulphur, Affiliated Ute, and other Second Circuit decisions52 in an
attempt to insure that the investing public will be able to effectively
protect itself from the machinations of corporate insiders.53 Shapiro
48495 F.2d at 240, quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 847-48
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
49 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969). See notes 20-22 supra. The imposition of tippee liability was foreshadowed
as early as Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), where the court indicated that
if defendants "were not insiders, they would seem to be 'tippees' . .. and subject to the
same duty as insiders." Id. at 410. Thus, the imposition of tippee liability by the
Shapiro court is no cause for surprise.
50See, e.g., Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 101 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971) ("the common law requirement of privity has all but vanished
from lOb-5 proceedings"); Heit v. -weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, 913 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 903 (1969) ("there is no necessity for contemporaneous trading in securities by in-
siders or by the corporation itself'); cf. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833,
860-61 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
51 Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). The Court indicated
that where a case involves a failure to disclose material information, "positive proof of
reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery." Id. at 153.
52 See, e.g., Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 354,
356-57 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438
F.2d 1167, 1171-72 (2d Cir. 1970); Globus v. Law Research Serv. Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1291
(2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
53 The Second Circuit previously indicated the need for private actions to enforce the
antifraud provisions of the federal securities law in Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 356 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973):
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represents an important judicial step in the development of strong, all-
inclusive protection against securities fraud.
Regrettably, the Shapiro court avoided venturing an opinion on
the issue of damages.5 4 In view of the number of potential investor-
plaintiffs in a Shapiro situation, the holding of the court brings with it
an almost boundless scope of potential liability - a liability which
might well prove ruinous to even the most financially sound defen-
dant.5 5 Additionally, the lOb-5 liability in Shapiro is not exclusive. The
same defendants might be held accountable by disgruntled stockholders
in derivative suits based on common law fraud.55 The expansion of
insider liability could well prove to be a pyrrhic victory, especially in
times of economic difficulty. A reasonable means for controlling the
total liability of insiders must be found in order to protect both the
securities industry and its clientele, the general investing public.5 7
Christopher M. McCarthy
[T]he Supreme Court, as well as other federal courts including our own, have
recognized that vigorous enforcement of the federal securities laws, particularly
the antifraud provisions, can be accomplished effectively only when implemented
b private damage actions.
1See 495 Fr.2d at 234, 241. The interlocutory nature of the appeal, see note 19 supra,
enabled the court to avoid ruling on the issue of damages. On remand, the district court
was left with the task of ascertaining the proper measure of damages. Id. at 241. It is
unfortunate that the Second Circuit failed to provide the district court with guidance.
Professor Ruder criticizes the practice of deciding liability without fixing damages in
the context of a lob-5 action. He argues that the potential for immense damage awards
should be an important factor in deciding whether to impose liability at all. Ruder,
Texas Gulf Sulphur the Second Round: Privity and State of Mind in Rule lOb-5 Purchase
and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. RIv. 423, 427 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Ruder].
55 In Ruder, supra note 56, the author estimates the amount of damages accruing in
the Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation. See text accompanying notes 20-22. If liability were
imposed upon Texas Gulf Sulphur for every share traded during the period of nondis-
closure, its liability, computed at the rate of $130 per share multiplied by the 3 million
shares traded in this period, would be over $390 million. That total is approximately
$150 million more than Texas Gulf Sulphur's then net worth. The damages in Shapiro
would not be as extreme if calculated by the same method. Douglas stock was at a high
of 90 when the defendants started selling and bottomed out about ten days later at a low
of 61. 495 F.2d at 233 n.8. Thus losses to purchasers of the stock during that period
could range as high as $29 per share. Since there were approximately 400,000 shares
traded during this period, strict compensatory damages would be somewhere in the range
of $10,000,000.
56 See Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817, 823 (2d Cir. 1973), remanded on other grounds
sub nom. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974) (tippee-broker held to be in "com-
mon enterprise" with tipper corporate director); Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494,
503, 248 N.E.2d 910, 915, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 85 (1969) (directors' breach of fiduciary duty).
The Shapiro defendants argued that, in light of decisions authorizing derivative actions
for misuse of corporate information, it was unnecessary to sustain plaintiffs' complaint
in order to effectuate the congressional purpose behind section 10(b). 495 F.2d at 241 n.18.
The court met this argument by noting that derivative actions are a product of state
law, and therefore not uniformly available throughout the country. Id. Furthermore, a
derivative action would do nothing to compensate defrauded investors such as the
Shapiro plaintiffs.
57 It has been suggested that damages be measured not by traders' losses, but by the
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amount that the insiders made as profits or avoided as losses. The money would be placed
in a fund and distributed pro rata among the plaintiffs. These relatively small recoveries
would be supplemented by awards of attorneys' fees. It is believed that this procedure
would both compensate injured parties and provide an adequate deterrent against in-
sider trading. Note, Damages to Uninformed Traders For Insider Trading on Impersonal
Exchanges, 74 CoLum. L. Rlv. 299, 313 (1974). It has been further suggested that damages
from the various types of actions, e.g., stockholders derivative actions and private 10b-5
actions, be limited to such a fund. The private awards would be satisfied first and the
balance, if any, would inure to the benefit of the corporation. Second Circuit Note, 48
ST. JOHN'S L. Rxv. 415, 424 (1973).
A more radical solution to the problem of excessive damage awards is elimination of
a private cause of action under lOb-5. The goals of compensation and deterrence under-
lying 10b-5 might be met equally well through alternative methods of curbing insider
misconduct. The SEC alone could seek injunctive and restitutory relief on behalf of de-
frauded traders, see, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971), and compensatory relief could be limited to Diamond and
Schein derivative actions, see note 59 supra, and suits based on common law fraud for
direct, face-to-face transactions. Such an approach, it has been argued, might be more
appropriate than permitting a plethora of compensatory suits that result in arguably
haphazard, economically wasteful results. See Note, Limiting the Plaintiff Class: Rule
lOb-5 and the Federal Securities Code, 72 MicH. L. REv. 1398, 1429-31 (1974).
